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Democratizing Indonesia: 





Triggered by the Asian currency crisis, Indonesia plunged into the times of violent 
change. With the downfall of the long-standing Soeharto rule in May 1998, changes of 
the state order started with great magnitude and rapidity under a new banner of 
“reformasi” (reform). What changes have occurred in this reformasi period? What do 
these changes signify? To answer these questions, it would be better to have a certain 
yardstick to allow us comparison. One possibility is to use a yardstick of history. What 
picture will emerge if we see the current array of changes in long-term historical 
perspectives is a main question of this paper. This paper intends to provide a bird’s-eye 
picture illustrating where in the Indonesian history the current restructuring of the state 
order is located. Rather than focusing on a specific area, I here attempt to broaden our 
outlook on Indonesia’s political, economic and social arenas in order to identify what 
are happening in these arenas, how they are mutually related, and what those events 
signify in the Indonesia’s historical context. 
 
1. Five Periods, Three Aspects and Three Approaches 
 
This paper divides the history of Indonesia after her independence as a sovereign state 
in 1949 into five periods1. 
  The first is the period of parliamentary democracy. Indonesia won 
international recognition as an independent sovereign state on 27 December 1949 with 
                                                   
1  Although the proclamation of the Republic Indonesia was made in 17 August 1945, this paper 
does not deal with the period of independence struggle from 1945 to 1949, for it was a confused 
period from the viewpoint of state order.IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
3
the effectuation of the Resolutions of the Hague Round Table Conference. Soon after 
that, the country was changed from a federation to a single republic. Based on the 1950 
Provisional Constitution that enacted in August 1950, party politics unfurled in the 
parliamentary system of the government during this period.   
  The second is the period of Guided Democracy led by President Soekarno. 
The Presidential Decree (Dekrit Presiden) of 1959 sent the country back to the 1945 
Constitution that imparted great powers to president. This took place because Soekarno 
got disgusted with unstable party politics. 
  While the above two periods are the conventional periodization, uniqueness of 
this paper’s periodization may exist in a division of the Soeharto period into two time 
frames, before and after 1985. A significant feature of the Soeharto regime was 
thorough institutionalization of an authoritarian rule with pembangunan (development) 
as the national ideology. But its efforts to institutionalize the ‘developmental 
authoritarianism’ were concentrated on the first half of the Soeharto period until 1985. 
The Soeharto government in 1985 completed the process of the institutionalization by 
enacting five political laws --- three laws on the parliamentary system (the Political 
Party and Golkar Law, General Election Law and the Parliament Constitution Law) for 
making the parliament function as a regime-stabilizing device, the Mass Organization 
Law that made it mandatory for all organizations to accept Pancasila, the nation’s five 
founding principles, as the only principle, and the National Referendum Law that in 
practice foreclosed the possibility of amending the 1945 Constitution.   
  I call this third period as the period of consolidation of the Soeharto regime. 
This period ranges from the time of the substantial seizure of power by then Army 
Minister, Lt.Gen. Soeharto by the 11 March 1966 Presidential Command Letter to the 
year of institutional completion of the Soeharto regime in 1985. This bifurcation to pre- 
and post-1985 periods can be applied to economic analysis too2. This is because the 
                                                   
2  It has been customary in economic analysis to periodize in reference to the fluctuation of real 
economy taken together with policy changes. For instance, Hill [1996:15-17] defined the following 
periods: rehabilitation and recovery (1966-70), rapid growth (1971-81), adjustment to lower oil IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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transfiguration of political regime after 1985 may have influenced the economy 
through economic policies. It is also because the G5 Plaza accord in 1985 triggered 
multilateral adjustment of exchange rates in East Asia and had a significant impact on 
the Indonesian economy with massive capital inflow. 
  I call the second half of the Soeharto regime ranging from 1985 to the fall of 
Soeharto in May 1998 as the period of transfiguration of the Soeharto regime. This was 
the fourth period of the post-independence Indonesian history. After 1985 the Soeharto 
regime, losing internal dynamism in creating new institutions, became concerned with 
conservation of the established political system. But in that very period new dynamics 
emerged in the economic and social arenas as international pressure built up for 
political democratization and economic liberalization, generating conflicts between the 
Soeharto regime and society. 
  The fifth period is the post-Soeharto period, called as the period of reformasi. 
The Soeharto government collapsed on 21 May 1998, igniting the process of 
disintegration of the Soeharto regime itself. Replacing pembangunan (development), 
reformasi (reform) became the slogan of the new era as well as the basis of legitimacy 
of the post-Soeharto governments. In the subsequent three years and a half, Indonesia 
has had three presidents --- B.J. Habibie (May 1998 to October 1999), Abdurrahman 
Wahid (October 1999 to July 2001), and Megawati Soekarnoputri (July 2001 to the 
present). 
  This paper analyzes the change over time of the state order from three aspects, 
namely political system, economic system, and the state-society relationship. The 
following Section 2 traces institutional changes that occurred in the five periods from 
these three aspects. Here I follow a “progressive approach”, in which institutions of the 
preceding period are regarded as a determinant of those of the following period. In 
                                                                                                                                                     
prices (1982-86), and liberalization and recovery (1987-). Sato [1995:336-7] used the following: 
rehabilitation and development commencement period (1966-73), oil boom period (1974-81), 
structural adjustment period (1982-86), manufacturing-export-led growth period (1987-). For 
periodization by industrialization policy, refer to Mihira and Sato eds. [1992], Chapter 2.IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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Section 3, I follow a “retrogressive approach”3, whereby the institutional and structural 
changes in the period of reformasi are regarded as having been already prepared in the 
preceding period. From this angle I pay attention to what was happening in the 
transfiguration period of the Soeharto regime after 1985. Section 4 describes what is 
happening in the period of reformasi from the three aspects, using a “contemporaneous 
approach”. On that basis, in Chapter 5, I attempt to reexamine the period of reformasi 
in the Indonesia’s historical context and to provide its future prospect. 
 
2. Historical Changes in the Political System, Economic System and 
State-Society Relationship 
 
2-1. Changes of the Political System 
 
Figure 1 gives a simplified picture of the changes of political system, economic system, 
and state-society relationship encompassing the five periods. As the figure indicates, 
the Indonesian political system has taken three successive forms. 
The first was a democratic system adopted in the parliamentary democracy 
period of the 1950s under the 1950 Provisional Constitution. This Constitution 
(Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara Republik Indonesia) inherited the contents of the 
Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Konstitusi Republik 
Indonesia Serikat), which was prepared and approved by the Hague Round Table 
Conference in 1949 . The 1950 Provisional Constitution embodied West European 
                                                   
3  “Progressive approach” and “retrogressive approach” are based on Suehiro [2002].
4  The effectuation of the Resolution of the Hague Round Table Conference on 27 December 1949 
transferred sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Indonesia. The sovereign state thus 
emerging was the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. However, the Republic of Indonesia, 
one of the constituent states of the federal system, subsequently absorbed other states to form a 
unitary republic. On 15 August 1950, the 1950 Provisional Constitution was promulgated as the 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. With this, the federal system was terminated and a IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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constitutionalism and democracy as basic thought. It provided for separation of powers 
under the representative polity and included detailed clauses guaranteeing basic human 
rights. It was entirely different from the 1945 Constitution promulgated with the 
Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945, which imparted strong powers to 
the president based on the Indonesian (Javanese to be more precise) traditional thought. 
On the basis of the 1950 Provisional Constitution, the parliamentary party politics 
flourished in the 1950s. 
  The second was the authoritarian system President Soekarno introduced 
during the Guided Democracy period. Learning that the attempt of party politics in the 
1950s brought nothing but political instability and gave rise to local insurgencies, 
Soekarno threw away the idea of parliamentary democracy. He suspended the 1950 
Provisional Constitution and decided to return to the 1945 Constitution by his 5 July 
1959 Presidential Decree. In fact this was the first time the 1945 Constitution was fully 
enforced, as it was anomalously implemented in the period of independence struggle. 
Soekarno’s tools of governance claimed to be based on the 1945 Constitution were, for 
instance, the president-led cabinet where President was concurrently the Prime 
Minister, suspension of the House of Representatives (DPR), suspension of general 
elections, inauguration of DPR and the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPRS: the supreme organ of the state) with members appointed by the President, 
enactment of the 1959 Political Party Law that restricted political parties’ activities, 
and dissolution of anti-government political parties by the President. Undoubtedly 
these were tools of authoritarian governance. This system, called Guided Democracy, 
was “democracy” in a genuinely Indonesian sense. It was kerakyatan   to be guided by 
                                                                                                                                                     
unitary republic was founded. This Constitution retained almost all of the contents of the 
Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, except for clauses referring to the 
federal system. It was called “provisional” because it stated that the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia would be made at a constitutional assembly to be later organized.
5  Kerakyatan, in direct translation, means “populism.” This should be distinguished from 
“democracy” as a concept originated from the Western thoughts. The origin of Indonesian IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
7
Soekarno’s wisdom. Soekarno as “the people’s spokesman” was assumed to directly 
represent the will of people (rakyat) without the medium of elections. It was certainly 
charismatic personal rule where there was no place for political institutions per se. 
Indonesia’s second president, Soeharto, inherited this Soekarno’s authoritarian 
system and elaborated it to a political institution. Soeharto innovated on the system in 
three ways. Firstly, he diluted the personal aspect of the system and institutionalized it 
by introducing democratic formalities like DPR, People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) and general elections. This was to allow him to claim that he was not ruling as a 
charisma but as a president elected by the people in a parliamentary system. But in 
reality, he created a mechanism of control so that the ruling governmental party 
without fail won general elections and MPR invariably elected him. Secondly, he 
upheld the national goal of pembangunan, or economic development, that his 
predecessor obviously failed to attain. By the logic that political stability was the 
prerequisite of economic development, Soeharto justified his authoritarian rule. Thirdly, 
Soeharto achieved social stability by establishing unitary control on society and 
depoliticizing it. Soeharto’s method of depoliticization of the society stood in contrast 
with Soekarno’s method of political mobilization, where Soekarno allowed 
pro-Soekarno parties to mobilize the society and he himself relied on direct support of 
the politicized masses of people. Soeharto completed the authoritarian system of his 
style in 1985, and did not change its institutional framework until his government 
collapsed. 
  The third is the democratic system in the period of reformasi that drastically 
departed from the preceding authoritarian system after the downfall of the Soeharto 
                                                                                                                                                     
kerakyatan is traced back to the nationalist movements at the beginning of the 20th century. In the 
1920s, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, a pioneer of the nationalist movement, defined the future Indonesia as 
a community embodying the people’s will, thereby establishing the concept of people’s sovereignty. 
As to how the people’s will was to be exercised, R.M. Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo advanced the idea 
that it would be enacted through the leader’s exercise of wisdom. Refer to Tsuchiya [1982] [1994] 
for details, and see also Kawamura [2003].IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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government. The currency crisis cancelled the achievement of pembangunan that had 
justified the Soeharto’s authoritarian rule. Popular movements for reformasi then arose, 
asking to reform the negative aspects of the rule and leading President Soeharto’s step 
down. Following his resignation, the setup of political institutions that had underpinned 
the Soeharto regime were completely renovated within a year or so. Under the new 
political laws, a free general election was carried out and Indonesia’s president was 
elected for the first time by vote at the newly organized MPR in October 1999. With 
these events, it can be judged that Indonesia shifted from authoritarian system to 
democratic system . 
  How Indonesia treated its constitution at this juncture is worthy of note. 
Instead of making a new constitution with democratization of the political system as 
were the cases with the Philippines and Thailand, Indonesia preferred to maintain the 
1945 Constitution and adapt it by amendments. It was amended four times in October 
1999, August 2000, November 2001 and August 2002. After these amendments, almost 
nothing actually remained of the original clauses except its preamble. But it is still 
called the 1945 Constitution. The adherence to the 1945 Constitution has a historical 
reason. The integrity of Indonesia as a single nation state despite its vast diversity 
almost solely consists in the fact that the peoples from far-flung territories shared the 
1945 Proclamation of Independence. The 1945 Constitution incarnates the shared spirit 
of independence. Despite of this adherence, the democratic system now in the making 
is quite different in basic philosophy from the political system provided by the original 
1945 Constitution. It is also different in constitutional foundation from the democratic 
system of the 1950s under the 1950 Provisional Constitution. Although party politics 
                                                   
6  This of course does not mean that a democratic system in Indonesia was consolidated. A process 
of trial and error will further continue searching for a democratic system appropriate to Indonesia. 
Regarding the concepts of transition and consolidation, this paper sees that the country completed 
transition to democracy with the October 1999 MPR and entered into a consolidation process, 
although it would be possible to argue that the transition process is continued into the subsequent 
middle-term period of groping democratic institutions.IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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now reviving have some similarities as in the 1950s, the Indonesia’s era of reformasiIDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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Figure 1 Historical Changes in the Political System, Economic System, and State-Society Relationship
 
1949- 1959- 1966- 1985- 1998-
Period Paliamentary Democracy Guided Democracy Soeharto-Regime Soeharto-Regime Post-Soeharto
Period Period Consolidation Transfiguration Period
Period Period
Government Soekarno Soeharto Habibie/A.Wahid/ Megawati
Basis of legitimacy Revolusi  (Revolution) Pembangunan (Development) Reformasi (Reform)
Political system Democratic system                                 Authoritarian system Democratic system
[Constitution] [1950 Provisional  [1945 Constitution] [amended 1945 Constitution]
 Constitution]
Economic system Capitalist system Socialistic system Capitalist system
Liberal economy Controled economy Liberal economy + Government intervention
Main actor Foreign State Private (Chinese) 膨Private (pribumi) Private膨腀 State + Foreign
+State
Performance * Middle Low 膨 Crisis High 膨 Low 膨⁈₁ꠠ Low 膨 Middle
State-society No control + Control + Control + Depoliticized Decontrol 膨 Reordering
relationship Politicized Mobilization
Note: * High: 6-8% growth per annum,    Middle: around 4% growth,   Low: around 2% growth,   Crisis: minus growth.
Source: by author.IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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has now stepped into is an entirely new stage from the point of view of evolution of 
political system. Indonesia in this sense now faces a new historic challenge. 
 
2-2. Changes in the Economic System
The Indonesian economy has gone through three successive systems. But the economic 
system changes have not corresponded to political system changes (Figure 1). 
  The first economic system Indonesia had was the 1950s economic system 
carried over from the colonial economy, whose continuity was ensured by the 
Resolution of the Hague Conference. Figure 1 characterizes this period as “a liberal 
economy under the capitalist system centered on foreign capital”. It meant a system 
unified with the Dutch economic system. Looking at economic actors, Euro-American 
capital centering on the Dutch controlled the backbone of the economy and Chinese 
capital as a part of foreign capital had its grips on commerce and small industries. 
Policy efforts were made to substitute pribumi (indigenous Malays) capital for part of 
the foreign capital but that did hardly work. Basically the colonial economic structure 
stayed untouched throughout this period [Thomas and Panglaykim, 1973; Glassburner 
1971]. 
  The second economic system introduced in tandem with President Soekarno’s 
Guided Democracy was Ekonomi Terpimpin, or Guided Economy, a socialistic 
controlled economy. In the second half of the 1950s, Soekarno had become frustrated 
with the failure of parliamentary politics as well as with its inability to wipe out colonial 
economic legacies. Public pressure also mounted calling for state direct intervention in 
the economy. In 1958 the government ventured to nationalize Dutch properties. 
Following this, state-led economic system was introduced, setting state enterprises as 
the core of the national economy and placing the private sector under state control 
through cooperatives and trade associations. But this system soon turned out disastrous 
as state enterprises showed poor performance, fiscal deficits enlarged and inflation was 
aggravated. 
  The third was a capitalist system that Soeharto introduced immediately after his 
ascension to power. This marked a drastic change of direction from Soekarno’s 
socialistic economic system. The new economic system focused on economic 
liberalization, open-door policy to foreign capital, development policies emphasizing 
promotion of food production and industrialization, macro economic stabilization 
suppressing fiscal deficits and inflation, and aid acceptance from IMF, the World Bank, 
the United States, the Europe and Japan. This change represented a shift of Indonesia’s IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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position from the East to the West in the Cold War context. The Soeharto government 
swiftly prepared legal institutions to implement pembangunan by 1968 and started to 
intervene in the economy through these institutions. From this time to the present 
reformasi period, the basic framework of Indonesia’s capitalist system supported by 
foreign aid and a certain level of government intervention, basically remains unchanged. 
However, the chief economic actors were changed. In the Soeharto-regime 
consolidation period, it was ethnic Chinese capital and state capital that expanded 
remarkably. In the regime’s transfiguration period it was pribumi big capital that grew 
faster. With the collapse of the Soeharto regime, this structure was subjected to 
reorganization with private big capital being nationalized or being sold to foreign capital 
[Sato, 2003]. 
  Let us here look on the political and economic systems together to clarify the 
differences between the two transitions, one from the Soekarno to the Soeharto era and 
the other from the Soeharto to the post-Soeharto era. The Soeharto government 
inherited the authoritarian system and spent one and a half decade in its 
institutionalization, while in the economy it quickly replaced the socialistic system with 
a capitalist system. This quick replacement was possible largely because the West 
countries offered a model of capitalist economy to Soeharto’s Indonesia . In contrast, in 
the post-Soeharto transition, Indonesia shifted swiftly from authoritarian system to 
democratic system, while in the economy it has inherited the capitalist system and is 
struggling to reorganize its structure. The rapidity of change in the political system 
indicates that most of the post-Soeharto political actors shared the common values they 
all should pursue, that is, political liberalization, democratization and a guarantee of 
human rights. 
2-3. Changes in the State-Society Relationship
There may be more angles than one to analyze state-society relationship, but here I 
adopt the extent of control by the state over society as a relevant angle to this paper’s 
framework. It is considered that state control on society in Indonesia has gone through 
                                                   
7  For instance, Mihira [1995: 201-212] verified the crucial role IMF’s advice played in the making 
of the “Renovation of the Basic Economic, Fiscal and Development Policies” (Provisional MPR 
Decision No.23, 1966), the first basic economic policy in the Soeharto era. This policy was 
announced in July 1966, only four months after Soeharto came to power and even before Indonesia 
officially rejoined to IMF.IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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four successive processes, in parallel with changes in political and economic systems 
(Figure 1). 
  The first stage was a situation of almost no state control over society in the 
parliamentary democracy period. At that time Indonesia had no state nucleus capable of 
intervening in social processes with a unified political will, capable in the sense of 
substituting for the colonial administration. Nor was the state equipped with 
mechanisms to intervene. There certainly were the party cabinet, parliament, 
bureaucracy and military, but they were alike weak as the body of intervention in 
society. Under these circumstances, various social actors launched their own social 
movements guided by their respective political wills, challenging or penetrating the 
state machinery in different directions. These movements were motivated by religion, 
ethnicity, regionalism, anti-Java feelings, or political ideologies. Among these 
movements included some anti-central government movements like Darul Islam 
movement seeking to establish an Islamic state, the Republic of South Maluku 
movement refusing integration into the Republic of Indonesia, and a Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia led by the Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin 
Indonesia) party and the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia: PSI) 
allied with local military forces. 
  The second stage arrived when the state began to control society under Guided 
Democracy. This period was opened up by President Soekarno’s repression of local 
rebellions. The control power of the state was strengthened in pace with the rise of the 
military, particularly the Army, as a political force. On the other hand, as Soekarno 
began to lean toward the left, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia: PKI) activated mass mobilization as part of Soekarno’s political base. Land 
reform promoted by PKI antagonized rural-based Islamic force, Nahdlatul Ulama Party. 
At this stage, though state began controlling society, plural political forces in the state 
were intervening in society in their respective ways. The state resorted simultaneously 
to contradictory means of social control --- political repression and mass mobilization. 
  The third stage, one of unitary state control of society, arrived with the 
establishment of the Soeharto regime. As an Army officer, Soeharto was keenly aware 
that state control of society and center’s control of regions were the key to the stability 
of the state and society. The Soeharto government introduced multifaceted tools for 
social control. Firstly, it weakened political parties, prohibited political party activities 
at the subdistrict and village levels in order to depoliticize society. Secondly, it 
established a unitary, centralized and nationwide governing machinery through two sets 
of hierarchies --- an administrative hierarchy of the bureaucracy and a security hierarchy IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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of the military regional headquarters --- from the central, provincial, through district, 
subdistrict to the village levels. Thirdly, all social sectors such as farmers, workers, 
teachers, and youth were organized each into a single official organization so that the 
central government could control social movements down to their local branches. 
Fourthly, the government had all the social political organizations accept Pancasila, the 
five founding principles of the nation, as the only principle to be followed. With this, 
the government de-islamized and depoliticized Islamic organizations. Fifthly, benefits 
of development were made tangible to the lowest social strata by education and public 
health services. Standard education was spread to help form a uniform Indonesian 
nation. Sixthly, the military would physically eliminate social resistance still continued 
in spite of all the above tools. In the first half of his rule, Soeharto completed his system 
of social control using these multiple measures and kept the system in place until the 
end of his rule. 
  The fourth stage is the current post-Soeharto stage where the thoroughgoing 
social control mechanism by the state was lifted. The Soeharto regime’s social control 
and power centralization were put to review and shifted toward decontrol of society and 
decentralization. The shift released long-suppressed popular protests. Also, 
inter-community conflicts exploded in many places. It would appear that Indonesia’s 
state-society relationship has gone back to the original state where the government had 
no control power, but that would not be a right perception. It would be more appropriate 
to view the current stage as a period when Indonesia is getting rid of the combination of 
a power-centralized strong state and depoliticized, uniform and weak society. Indonesia 
is now in search of a more balanced relationship between a power-dispersed state and a 
society of diversity. Though depoliticized, there were quite a few social organizations 
working already under the Soeharto regime, conducting various activities such as 
religious, rural development, social education, and civic movement. In the era of 
reformasi, these social organizations have been given freedom of activities and even 
obtained the freedom to appeal to the government. Indonesia has entered into a stage 
searching for balanced state-society and center-region relationships, drawing lessons 
from the experiences of the preceding three stages. 
 
3. What Was Happening in the Soeharto-Regime Transfiguration Period? 
3-1.Why is the Review of the Transfiguration Period Important?
In the preceding section, I situated the current reformasi era in the history of the IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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changing political system, economic system and state-society relationship. This is the 
necessary procedure if we want to understand this era in the context of the Indonesian 
history. But this approach alone would not allow us to see the dynamism that has caused 
the changes of systems. Let us ask, for instance, whether the energies that brought about 
system changes in the reformasi era were born anew with the end of the pembangunan 
era, or had already been accumulated under the previous regime? We would hardly be 
able to answer this question merely by recourse to the progressive approach we earlier 
used. 
  Tracing back the changes in the reformasi period, we can find many of them 
had their origins in the second half of Soeharto’s rule. This is why I divide the Soeharto 
era into two periods and discuss the second half independently in this section. In other 
words, we need to analyze what happened in the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period 
if we want to understand the era of reformasi. 
After 1985 the Soeharto regime lost original dynamism of institutional buildup 
and began to devote itself to preservation of the entrenched political system. As to the 
passage from the first to the second period, Shiraishi [1992] [1997], focusing on 
President Soeharto himself, provided accounts about how Soeharto’s own 
transfiguration transfigured the regime. Soeharto had been successful in keeping a 
delicate balance between the logic of state, namely, developmentalism, as the head of 
state, and the logic of family, kekeluargaan (family principle or familyism) as a father 
of the nation. But gradually he began to lean toward familyism, one in the narrowest 
sense --- predilection for his wife and six children. To put it differently, Soeharto 
prioritized the military to secure stability and ethnic Chinese to achieve development in 
the regime consolidation period. But after 1985, he began to shift his support base from 
the military to Islam and from ethnic Chinese to pribumi (Sato [2002] 78-81). 
Ultimately, in my version, this shift reflected his desire to bequeath state power to his 
eldest child (the first daughter), for which the support of pribumi and Islam circles was 
indispensable. 
  In this paper I would like to call attention to another viewpoint. The solid 
authoritarian regime Soeharto established by 1985 seems to have failed to adapt to the 
changes in the international environment after 1985. It also failed to absorb dynamism 
for social change influenced by the external environment. This failure generated internal 
contradictions within the regime and conflicts between the regime and society. The 
contradictions and conflicts eventually generated energies for regime change that 
ushered the era of reformasi. In other words, the great changes that occurred in the 
reformasi era originated where and when the regime had already been plagued by IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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contradictions. 
  Two international factors mainly affected the Soeharto regime from the latter 
half of the 1980s through the 1990s. One was the trend for democratization and respect 
for human rights as the main concern of the international community after the end of the 
Cold War in 1989. The other is the rise of the trend for economic liberalization and 
market economy. Let us now examine how the Soeharto regime responded to these two 
international trends. 
 
3-2. “Democratization from Above” and its Limitations
In response to the international trend favoring democratization, the Soeharto 
government set out to try “democratization from above.” President Soeharto became 70 
years old in 1991, and voices were raised calling for “openness” (keterbukaan) to long 
tabooed political discussion about the future of Indonesia, including succession of 
power. The discussion was kicked off in 1989 by an article titled, “Aspiring to normal 
politics” by retired Army Gen. Soemitro [1989]. In that article he claimed the need for 
making rules for change of government. The then U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Paul 
Wolfowitz backed Soemitro asking for smooth government change and political 
“openness”. Confident in its ability to keep society under control with the institutional 
consolidation completed by 1985, the Soeharto government eased restriction on 
expression. In 1990 the government further lifted a ban on workers’ strikes and a ban on 
political activities on campuses. A series of policies for “democratization from above” 
was thus enforced, animating activities by workers, press, students, communities, 
human rights NGOs and environment NGOs. For instance, following the lifting of the 
ban on strikes, labor strikes increased from 19 in 1989 to 61 in 1990 and 112 in 1991. 
At least two new unofficial labor unions were organized, in addition to the existing 
single official labor union. 
  But it was not long before the “democratization from above” policy showed its 
limitations. As workers’ demonstrations developed into riots and as the press began to 
expose intra-ruling group feuds, the government cracked down on them, arresting and 
incriminating the chairperson of the unofficial labor union and banning influential 
journals . The Soeharto government came out in full force to repress movements of 
                                                   
8  For example, after workers’ demonstration organized by the Indonesia Welfare Labor Union 
(SBSI) triggered the Medan riot in 1994, the union chairman Mochtar Pakpahan was arrested. 
Another example was the prohibition of Tempo and two other journals in 1994. This is because the IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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“democratization from below” that became active in response to the 
“democratization-from-above” policy, the moment the government judged their demand 
for political participation to have gone beyond the permissible level. But this repression 
came just when the social pendulum was swinging toward “openness”. The repression 
even helped society more keenly perceive contradictions of the regime and awaken 
people politically. It was in this period that conflicts came open between the 
authoritarian state clinging to unitary control by social depoliticization on the one hand 
and the increasingly politically awakening society on the other. 
  Unlike this domestic politics, the East Timor issue as an international issue 
followed a different trajectory. Reacting to international trend for respect for human 
rights, the Soeharto government in 1989 “opened” East Timor to foreign visitors. The 
government intended to impress foreigners with the progress of pembangunan in East 
Timor and thus to eclipse the image of human rights violation so that it would win 
international recognition of the annexation of East Timor. In the same context, 
Indonesia volunteered to be a member of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights. But the East Timorese independence movement, stepping into the focus of 
global attention, invigorated its activities. In this setting, the so-called Dili incident took 
place in November 1991. Indonesia’s security forces opened gunfire against funeral 
marchers for independence activists in the East Timor capital city, Dili. The Indonesian 
government announced 50 killed, while the Amnesty International estimated 100-270 
killed. This incident invited heavy accusations from the international community. The 
Dutch government, chairing the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), froze 
aid to Indonesia. The Indonesian government with unusual rapidity made an 
investigation, announced the result, and dismissed two military commanders. Unlike the 
above-mentioned domestic cases, the East Timor issue thus forced the Soeharto 
government to react to international repercussions. Following the Dili incident, the 
government established a National Committee on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in 
1993 to placate international opinion. This government committee in later years 
developed its own human rights-protecting activities, relatively independently from the 
government. It played the role of the only official channel Indonesian society could 
                                                                                                                                                      
press exposed that the Minister of Finance and the military had criticized state minister in charge of 
research and technology, B.J.Habibie, on his purchase of used East German warships. See IDE ed. 
[1995] for details. In 1993, Marsinah, a female labor movement leader, was murdered. This case 
drew public attention as the military was suspected to have involved in. But fact finding efforts by 
the Attorney’s Office reached an impasse.IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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utilize to voice its political demands and grievances on human rights violations. 
 
3-3. Dualism in the Indonesia’s Response to Economic Liberalization
The Indonesian economy entered into a sustained boom from the end of the 1980s, 
particularly after massive capital inflow from Asian NIEs and Japan began following 
the 1985 G5 Plaza accord. Under the influences of the international trends for economic 
liberalization, Indonesian firms began to assimilate globalization practices with regard 
to fund procurement and multinational investment. Some leading firms, eager to obtain 
lower-cost longer-term funds, rushed to borrow from overseas, while others actively 
extended their business into Hong Kong, China, and ASEAN countries. 
  The emphasis of government economic policies at that time was on economic 
liberalization and private capital utilization. As for liberalization, the government cut 
tariffs, abolished restrictions on foreign investment, and took other trade and investment 
deregulation measures. In an effort to utilize private capital, the government encouraged 
private firms to participate in public work and resource development projects, which 
had long been monopolized by state-owned enterprises, mainly on a BOT (build, 
operate and transfer) basis. 
  These economic liberalization measures, however, generated dualism in 
economic structure and policy implementation. In the first place, established business 
groups activated fund raising from overseas sources, while newly-developing business 
groups became more dependent on domestic banks, particularly state-owned banks. In 
the second place, when a downstream sector of a given industry was liberalized with 
tariff cuts, it was often coupled with protective measures for the midstream and 
upstream sectors for import substitution. Such protective measures were not limited to 
higher tariffs but also included non-tariff barriers, for instance, designation of a few 
producing or import companies. This last measure was applied, among others, to the 
steel and petrochemical industries. Thirdly, in privatization projects originally intended 
to increase efficiency, some specific companies often won project contracts without 
open bidding. In such cases, the government allowed the winning contractors to set 
service prices higher than the international average. 
From the end of the 1980s on, such lucrative business opportunities as 
privatization projects, investments into protected industries, and massive state bank 
loans began to be allocated increasingly to specific businessmen. They were not capable 
to make use of globalizing economy but had inside tracks within the ruling groups. The 
most conspicuous of such specific businessmen were children and relatives of President IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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Soeharto, including his eldest daughter and his third son. Behind the economic 
liberalization, the structure of KKN (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme, that is, corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism) of favor for the Soeharto family and politically connected 
businessmen became even more entrenched. Indonesian people, now becoming 
politicized, were increasingly aware that KKN was a built-in fault of the Soeharto 
regime. It is true that the real income level of the society was generally rising thanks to 
the booming economy, but people who had no connection with powers felt relative 
deprivation against the privileged classes. 
  To sum up, the Soeharto regime in its transfiguration period, though it did ease 
social control to adapt to the democratization trends, decisively rejected society’s 
demands for political participation. While liberalizing economy, it used liberalization in 
a perverted manner to build up a mechanism to benefit specific politically-connected 
capitalists. Political awareness in the society helped the public to see this development 
critically. It later led to a rise of popular movement for reformasi, eventually bringing 
the most conspicuous changes in the two areas, democratization of political institutions 
and dissolution of the vested interest structure of the economy. 
 
4. What Is Happening in the Reformasi Period?
Now let us take a look into what is happening in the reformasi period following the fall 
of the Soeharto government. I examine this with regard to political system, economic 
system, and state-society relationship 9. Broadly speaking, reformasi  signifies an 
antithesis to the Soeharto regime. It demands a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, 
from power concentration to decentralization, from political suppression to 
liberalization, from social control to liberalization, and demands dissolution of the 
vested interest structure under the Soeharto regime. 
 
4-1. Change of the Political System 
                                                   
9  For post-Soeharto political and economic transformation, New Zealand Asia Institute [1999],   
Manning and Diermen [2000], Soesastro et al. [2003] follow new developments, and Lloyd and 
Smith [2002] provides historical perspective. For economic system and policies, see Boediono 
[2002], Ikhsan et al [2002], Rachbini [2001]. Most of economic analysis, however, does not directly 
deal with institutional changes in economic policy making process. The analysis here owes much to 
a series of discussion in a research project on “transformation of Indonesia’s political and economic 
systems and its prospects” organized by IDE in 2000-2002. IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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--- from Simple Liberalization to a Search of New Institutions
After President Soeharto stepped down on May 21 1998, political laws that had served 
as the core of the Soeharto’s authoritarian system was abolished and replaced by new 
laws. Under the new laws, free general elections were held in June 1999. The People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) consisting of newly elected members was convened in 
October 1999, and elected President by vote for the first time in the Indonesian history. 
At the same MPR session, the 1945 Constitution that imparted strong powers to the 
president was amended for the first time since Indonesia’s independence. With these 
events, it can be considered that Indonesia departed from the authoritarian system and 
shifted to a democratic system. 
  A major achievement in the period before the election of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999, namely the period of Habibie government was, 
in a word, political liberalization. In concrete, it comprised the guarantee of political 
freedom and political participation, and decentralization of presidential power 
[Kawamura, 2000:14-18]. Regulations on speech, assembly, association and thoughts 
were liberalized and these freedoms were later guaranteed as basic human rights in the 
1945 Constitution at the second amendment in August 2000. Election systems were 
renovated to guarantee people’s political participation. The freedom of setting up 
political parties was recognized and party activities became legal down to the village 
level. Public servants were given the freedom of choosing political parties, other than 
the previous ruling governmental party Golkar. President’s discretion to intervene in 
political parties and to machinate the parliament was greatly restricted. The amended 
Constitution 1945 provided that the same person can be elected president only twice and 
the office of President shall be 10 years at maximum.   
  The liberalization of political institutions has brought about the following 
evolutionary process: Formerly suppressed forces came to rise making use of the newly 
acquired freedom; the rise of new forces destabilized politics; learning from the 
instability, the political players started a search for a more balanced political 
institutions. 
  Political parties and their home ground, the House of Representatives (DPR), 
began to play the most conspicuous role in the central politics. DPR for the first time 
exercised its right to legislation at the instance of House members and right to 
interpellate the government. DPR also became to take an active part in political 
processes through policy discussions and approval (or disapproval) on appointments of 
chiefs of government agencies. When President Abdurrahman Wahid excluded IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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political-party-based ministers from his cabinet, DPR openly confronted him by 
adopting two warning memoranda addressed to the President. It was on DPR’s strength 
that MPR was convened to decide dismissal of Abdurrahman Wahid. DPR thus in 
practice placed MPR, a supreme state organ having the right to appoint or dismiss 
President, under its control, and easily ousted the democratically-elected President 
before his term expired. President on his part had no power to dissolve DPR. Although 
Indonesia adopts the presidential system, DPR substantially rose to a position superior 
to the president. This shows that political liberalization brought reversal of power 
between DPR and President and consequent political instability. 
  The task that emerged in this situation is introduction of a new political 
institution that operates on checks and balances and enables stability even under the 
condition of multiple political parties. The third and fourth amendment of the 1945 
Constitution in November 2001 and August 2002 can be evaluated as the first step of 
institutional reform toward this direction. The main points of the amendments were as 
follows: (1) president and vice-president shall be elected directly by public vote, and no 
longer by MPR; (2) the legislature shall be made to have two houses by establishing the 
House of Regional Representatives (DPD) in addition to the House of Representatives 
(DPR); (3) MPR shall be constituted as the joint body of the two houses, with the right 
to establish the constitution and the right to dismiss president and vice-president; (4) the 
Constitutional Court which has the right to judge unconstitutional legislation is 
established in the judiciary. On the occasion of dismissal of president and vice-president, 
this court shall judge illegality of the questioned action before MPR is convened. 
  The new institution will be put into force beginning with the general and 
presidential elections scheduled for 2004. This reform intends Indonesia to depart from 
its unique mechanism of MPR as a single supreme state organ10 toward the separation 
of three powers. But the powers of the legislature will still remain superior to president 
even under the new institution, though the position of president is strengthened by direct 
election. The search for a democratic and more stable political institution appropriate to 
Indonesia will still continue after the elections in 2004. 
The pendulum has swung widely over the reform of the military, too. At the 
beginning of democratization, a demand for the military reform moved to an extreme 
end, a radical reform, and then in the opposite direction, toward reappreciation of the 
role of the military. Since the military was an important component of the Soeharto 
regime, society demanded its radical reform. Reformers focused their criticism on the 
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“dual functions” (dwi fungsi) assigned to the military --- national defense and security 
function and social political function. They insisted that the military’s social political 
function should be abolished and that security function should be transferred to civilian 
police, restricting the military only to the national defense role. Faced by this pressure, 
the military carried out a self-reform for depoliticization, abolishing social political 
posts in the national and regional commands, prohibiting active military service 
personnel from taking political posts, and reducing the number of appointed seats for 
military representatives in the parliament11. The Habibie government separated police 
from the military, placing it under civilian control, and withdrew garrison forces from 
Aceh and East Timor where struggle for independence continued. President 
Abdurrahman Wahid went further to opt for peaceful solutions, by suspending use of 
military forces in Aceh and Papua (called Irian Jaya up to January 2002) and by starting 
dialogue with independence movements. He also pushed forward civilian control over 
the military, for the first time appointing a civilian to the Minister of Defense and a 
naval man to the Commander of the military. 
  But as the public security deteriorated in Aceh and conflicts in other regions 
became aggravated, nationalist forces sharing the same philosophy with the military 
raised their voices calling for strong security functions of the military. The pledge of 
depoliticization notwithstanding, the military played a decisive role in pulling 
Abdurrahman Wahid down from presidency by not obeying the President. As Megawati, 
the head of a nationalist party, became President, voices became louder in the 
government for the need to revive the military’s security and intelligence functions. 
While the peace dialogue in Aceh bore fruit in the peace agreement with GAM (fee 
Aceh movement) in December 2002 on the one hand, the once abolished area command 
of the Army (Kodam) in Aceh was revived and military units were reinforced on the 
other hand. President Megawati eventually announced a start of full-scale military 
operations in Aceh against GAM in May 2003, after the peace agreement broke down 
with a failure of disarmament. This development clearly shows that a backlash is 
occurring pressing the military’s recovery as a guardian of national stability. The 
amended 1945 Constitution defined the mission of the national military as “defending, 
                                                   
11  The second amendment of the Constitution 1945 in August 2000 in practice decided abolishment 
of the appointed seats for the military in DPR in 2004 by stipulating that all the seats in DPR shall be 
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protecting, and preserving the national integrity and sovereignty.” In reference to this 
constitutional provision, efforts to properly locate the military’s functions in the overall 
state order will still continue for the next term of the government from 2004 to 2009. 
 
4-2. Reform of the Economic Structure
In contrast with the dramatic institutional changes in the political arena, reform efforts 
in the economic arena are more time-consuming. The reform intends to reorganize the 
economic structure while preserving the basic institutional framework in the previous 
era. Hit by the 1997 Asian currency crisis, Indonesia too launched an economic reform 
accepting the IMF conditionality just as other crisis countries. But in the Indonesian 
case, the economic reconstruction in the banking and corporate sectors required to 
disintegrate the structure of vested interests formed under the Soeharto regime. 
  The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) set up by the government 
in 1998 took the initiative in the banking reform and disposal of corporate debts. As the 
IBRA work proceeded, the map of big business has been redrawn at least in three ways. 
Firstly, as bank ownership of major banks changed through closure, nationalization and 
capital injection, the earlier capital ties between banks and business groups almost 
completely disintegrated. As a result, most of the surviving banks became independent 
banks, while many business groups lost their banking wings. Secondly, large debtors 
who received ample loans mainly from state banks and became insolvent included 
owners of rapidly-grown business groups that used to be close to President Soeharto. 
Their debt disposal helped to disintegrate the collusive structure between the large bank 
borrowers and political power. Thirdly, some leading ethnic Chinese business groups 
were obligated to repay liquidity support loans their affiliated banks received from the 
central bank on the occasion of bank run. To fulfill this obligation, they are compelled 
to sell major assets of their business groups through IBRA. The Salim group, the largest 
business group in Indonesia, was severely hit by this measure. In this manner, many of 
the capitalists that proliferated around the power center in the Soeharto regime faced 
asset liquidation, no matter whether they were ethnic Chinese or pribumi. 
  After democratization started, major players influencing processes of economic 
policy making greatly increased. During the Soeharto period, a handful of economic 
technocrats from University of Indonesia who were closely linked to the World Bank 
and IMF had collectively monopolized planning and implementation of macro IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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economic policies12. They occupied the major posts of the National Development 
Planning Agency (Bappenas), Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. This unitary 
rule of the economic technocrats had come to an end in the last phase of the Soeharto 
government. With this, the style of prompt policy implementation predicated on 
collaboration with the IMF and World Bank also came to an end. Compared with the 
economic technocrats’ system, the post-Soeharto policy process is much more time and 
cost consuming. This may be interpreted as the “democratization cost”. This is firstly 
because of a rise of DPR’s power in policy making, and secondly because of a 
multi-layer structure of policy discussion and monitoring. For instance, in deciding 
IBRA’s strategic asset sales, major agencies involved are IBRA itself, the minister in 
charge (formerly the Minister of Finance but under Megawati government, changed to 
Laksamana Sukardi, the state minister in charge of state-owned enterprises), IBRA 
monitoring agencies, the Financial Sector Policy Committee consisting of economic 
ministers, President, DPR, and IMF. Policy discussion sometimes reflects interests of 
political parties and economic nationalism. One important task for the government in 
the democratizing era is to give first priority to economically rational judgment, 
controlling political intervention and coordinating interests of various players involved. 
  Improvement in governance of government and corporations was declared a 
crucial topic in IMF-led economic reform. To be wiped out are the collusion between 
the power holders and capitalists, public money embezzlement by government high 
officials, lack of transparency in government off-budget accounting, lack of information 
disclosure in corporate accounting, and dysfunction of monitoring mechanisms on these 
irregularities. In the post-Soeharto era, a new central bank law was enforced to 
guarantee the independence of the central bank from administrative authority. Also 
enacted was the law banning monopoly and unhealthy competition. Concerning 
corporate governance, new stock exchange regulations were made to obligate all listed 
companies to have “independent commissioners” and to set up “auditing committees” 
headed by independent commissioners. Other mechanisms to monitor the government 
and corporations are being set up one after another. 
Despite these efforts to institutionalize monitoring functions, cases of 
corruption and official money embezzlement are still occurring in the post-Soeharto 
period13. Rather, KKN threatens to spread wider as party politics and local politics 
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flourishes. This evidences that KKN is not merely a legacy of the Soeharto regime but a 
phenomenon accompanying any regime. A firm political will and effective judiciary are 
required to wipe out KKN practice. However, as the judiciary is said to be the most 
corrupt agency, it will still take long for Indonesia to conquer the deep- rooted KNN. 
 
4-3. Changes in the Center-Region and State-Society Relationships
The fall of the Soeharto regime signified the demise of a unitary centralized system and 
the demise of uniform state control of society. The Habibie government’s adoption of 
decentralization policy immediately kicked off a mighty tide of local movements. After 
the uniform state control over society was gone, we witness signs of resurgence of 
various community-rooted social orders. 
  Let us first look at the center-region relationship. In 1999 the Habibie 
government instituted new laws that transferred administrative powers to regional 
governments and changed the rule of distribution of government funds (the enactment 
of these laws was in January 2001). By these laws, the vertical hierarchy of authority 
from the central government to province, district / city, and subdistrict was replaced by 
horizontal relationship of responsibility at each regional level. In that new system, 
provincial governors, district governors / city mayors were to be elected by provincial, 
district / municipal assemblies respectively, to which they are answerable. It was also 
decided that 80% of revenue from local natural resources should return to the concerned 
local governments (except for oil and natural gas that are an important source of fund 
for the central government; the local governments’ revenue shares are 15% and 30% 
respectively). Stimulated by this system change toward decentralization, local 
movements emerged presenting their respective demands. The formerly 
Portuguese-owned East Timorese movement intensified its demand for independence. 
So did the separatist movements in resource-rich Aceh and Papua. Demand was 
presented for local participation in resource development projects from Riau and East 
Kalimantan. Banten, West Java’s highly cohesive community, asked for separation from 
the West Java province. The government responded to these demands in specific ways – 
recognition of independence for East Timor through a referendum; legislation of special 
autonomy laws for Aceh and Papua conceding to demands from the respective local 
governments; in Riau and Kalimantan acceptance of the provincial and district 
governments’ shareholding in the state-run oil and coal development projects; and 
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creation of five new provinces including Banten14. 
  The shift to decentralization has brought about two major changes. The first is 
attempts to build a new center-region relationship. Local governments started to enjoy 
the newly endowed powers, such as their rights to introduce new local taxes. The central 
government has the duty to supervise local governments. But the central government 
perceives that this supervision must be different in nature from the previous unilateral 
imposition or prohibition, and take on a bilateral style by which the local can ultimately 
find appropriate ways of exercise of power. Going a step further than relations between 
the central and the respective local governments, new systems have been introduced to 
allow local governments to collectively participate in national politics. For instance, the 
provincial and district assemblies formed their nation-wide associations respectively 
and presented joint demands to the central government policies. In MPR, a fraction of 
regional representatives was allowed to revive to represent local demands. This function 
is succeeded to the House of Regional Representatives (DPD) newly set up after the 
general elections in 2004. 
  The second change is the reorganization of local political order. As 
gubernatorial elections started in the provincial and district assemblies, local political 
elite groups have engaged in fierce feuds over allocation of the newly endowed local 
administrative and fiscal powers. Such inter-elite conflicts can well be the hidden cause 
for inter-community conflicts as evinced by the religious conflicts in North Maluku and 
Poso in Central Sulawesi
ㄵ. Localities have newly emerged as arenas of political 
struggle, where the practices of money and concession politics also tend to diffuse. 
  Let us then go to the state-society relationship. The collapse of the Soeharto 
regime brought about the lifting of institutional state control over society, with the 
recognition of freedom of speech, association, and thoughts. The passage to social 
liberalization has caused two major changes. The first is evolution of new state-society 
relationship. In the immediate aftermath of liberalization, protests from society even 
overwhelmed the state power. For example, not a few district governors and village 
chiefs were ousted by the residents’ direct exercise of force. Later, social movements 
became sophisticated, seeking to get popular demands reflected to policy making 
through peaceful demonstrations, petitioning, and public hearings in assemblies. The 
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Abdurrahman Wahid government had a NGO leader as a cabinet member, while the 
Megawati government has a head of the labor union federation in its cabinet. With the 
participation of earlier excluded social forces in administration, government policies 
also had to change. A good example is the minimum wage policy in favor of workers 
under the Megawati government. 
  The second change is the reorganization of social order at the level of 
residential communities. This social reordering occurred as state control of society was 
liberalized and the people were released from a uniform “nation” formation. The 
Soeharto government made efforts to form a uniform “Indonesian nation” by nationally 
uniform education in bahasa Indonesia, standardization of primary education and 
Pancasila education. In the reformasi era, the government policy changed to respect for 
social cultural peculiarity of each region and community. The new law on 
decentralization recognized village administration based on adat (customary laws). In 
some regions, the traditional village formation as well as adat-based social order started 
to revive. It is true that social conflicts are sometimes breaking out in this process of 
social reordering. But it would be incorrect to conclude that the revival of 
community-specific orders is the immediate cause for inter-community conflicts. Major 
conflicts, in fact, have occurred in a multi-religious or multi-ethnic society, where 
wealth distribution among such groups had got skew in the Soeharto era, or where 
political conflicts in the post-Soeharto era were imported from outside into local arenas. 
The conflict between the indigenous Dayaks and newcomer Maduras in West and 
Central Kalimantan is an example of ethnic conflicts caused by skewed wealth 
distribution, while the Islam-Christian conflicts in Maluku, North Maluku and at Poso 
in Central Sulawesi are cases where religions were exploited for political interests. 
 
5. Historical Location of the Reformasi Period and Future Perspectives
The fall of the established state system had an impact on a whole spectrum ranging from 
the political system through economic structure to social order. The processes of 
post-Soeharto changes as we outlined above show a common pattern; once the yoke of 
unitary state control was released, things swung to the extreme end of liberalization, 
disorder and disintegration, and then swung back to reordering. But the reformasi 
slogan itself shows nothing tangible about where the reordering is bound for. Moreover, 
there is no single political will holder like former President Soeharto to orient all these 
changes toward a single goal. In fact the absence of the single strong leadership 
characterizes the era of reformasi. IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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  Tracing back the current broad changes, we identify their origin in the Soeharto 
time conflict between the authoritarian state and society demanding political 
participation. Society’s growing awareness of this conflict turned to energies to later 
give rise to the crustal movements. Here we mean by society the aggregate of politically 
conscious urban residents, middle classes, intellectuals and social elite, rather than 
village communities. The drastic reform of political institutions such as the public 
presidential election and the establishment of DPD represents institutionalization of 
political participation pressed by the demand of this segment of population. The 
political reordering precedes other reforms even though it is an utterly new challenge 
having no referent points in Indonesian history. This fact should indicate the magnitude 
of transformational energies that had been accumulated in this area. 
  In comparison, reorganization of economic actors goes on in the framework 
largely inherited from the previous period. What we can trace back to the preceding 
period as the root of changes is a social criticism on the structure of privilege organized 
around the political power center. Therefore, the reform efforts focus on the dissolution 
of the former allied structure of power and capital. But when it comes to governance of 
government that resulted in KKN practice, party politicians now partaking of power 
seem to have little motivation to beat it by radical institutional reform. 
What is happening at the regional and local community levels should be 
regarded as the consequence, rather than the cause, of the downfall of the Soeharto 
regime. The fall of the regime terminated unitary state control, which may appear to 
have returned the country to the state of no control that characterized the initial stage of 
the history of Indonesia. But it should also be emphasized that local governments have 
now made their debut as political actors manifesting their political will to grope for new 
center-regional relationships and to create a new order of local political society. They do 
so critically reflecting on Indonesia’s historical experiences. 
  What is harder to foresee is the future of national unity after the uniform 
“nation” forming efforts are gone. It would be desirable to reconstitute national unity as 
a chain of loose linkage of local communities and adat societies in mutual recognition 
of their diversity and particularities. For such unity to be functional, intermediary actors 
are required to coordinate inter-community conflicts and to mediate between the 
communities and the state. Whether such a role is to be played by provincial and district 
governments or by non-governmental agencies such as traditional religious 
organizations, local associations or civic groups, is still to be seen. But in any form, 
emergence of various coordinating agencies is required to take the place of “the strong 
state” that had functioned for long as the nation-integrating agency. IDE Research Paper No. 1, August 2003 
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Lastly, let us look at tasks and prospects of the Megawati government. 
Megawati rose from vice-presidency to presidency in July 2001 for serving the rest of 
the predecessor’s tenure of 39 months. If she is reelected in the 2004 presidential 
election, she will stay in office until 2009. President Megawati differs from her two 
immediate predecessors in significant ways. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid served as 
presidents for only 17 months and 21 months respectively, but both fairly hastily tried to 
carry out reform. Habibie liberalized the political institutions, decentralized central 
powers, and set the scenario of independence of East Timor. Abdurrahman Wahid 
challenged reform of the military. In the climate of reform thus created, various 
demands and conflicts welled forth from society. In contrast to these presidents, 
President Megawati is not a type of strong leadership, but tends to wait for a consensus 
to be formed after leaving various opinions to well out. If Megawati is given a relatively 
long time than the two preceding presidents, it is desirable that she goes slow but steady 
to grapple with hosts of problems that arose in the reformasi era, ranging from political 
institution reform, economic structure reform, power decentralization, to reorganization 
of social order and reconstitution of national unity. The Megawati period is likely to be 
“a period of groping” after solutions to balance reform and stability. Economically, it is 
a realistic prospect for post-Soeharto Indonesia to follow a domestic demand-led 
middle-road path of around 4% GDP growth per annum, as distinct from the Soeharto’s 
high-road growth path of 6-8% supported by massive inflow of foreign aid and direct 
investment. The above characteristics indicate that the Megawati government tends to 
be internal-affairs-oriented in socio-politic as well as economic management. But 
precisely for this reason, the Megawati government needs to have real sensibility to the 
international situation, locating where Indonesia is in it strategically. This is significant 
for Indonesia in order to avoid having “a lost decade” just in the current 
rapidly-changing times of globalization, technological revolution, and competition. The 
efforts of groping for national order should be directed to overcome the country’s 
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